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DRIVING INTO THE ROUGH: CONFLICTING DECISIONS ON THE
RIGHTS OF DISABLED GOLFERS IN MARTIN v. PGA TOUR INC.
AND OLINGER v. UNITED STATES GOLF ASS'N
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon hearing that Jack Nicklaus, arguably the greatest golfer of all
time, was considering using a golf cart on the Senior Professional Golf
Association ("PGA") Tour, Casey Martin poetically suggested to him,
"[s]wallow your pride and ride."1 Jack Nicklaus needing to ride a cart to
compete is somewhat ironic, considering Nicklaus was one of many golfers
who were outspokenly opposed to using carts during professional golf
competitions.2 Commentary over whether disabled professional golfers
Casey Martin and Ford Olinger should be permitted to ride golf carts dur-
ing competitions has been prevalent in political, social and academic cir-
cles.3 When President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Americans
1. Martin to Nicklaus: Swallow Pride, Take a Ride, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 10,
1999, at 2G.
2. See Tanya R. Sharpe, Casey 's Case: Taking a Slice Out of the PGA Tour's No-Cart
Policy, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 783, 784 (1999) (discussing journalists' responses to
testimony by Jack Nicklaus and Arnold Palmer during Martin's trial); Clifton
Brown, Nicklaus Says Carts Shouldn't Be Allowed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at C2
(noting Jack Nicklaus' statement that walking is physically part of game of golf and
that allowing Martin or anyone else to ride golf carts would discriminate against
other players on tour); Pros Question Martin Ruling, TAMPA TRiB., Feb. 12, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 2764712 (describing Paul Azinger's and Fred Couples' criti-
cism of golf cart use during tournament competitions); Chuck Schoffner, Palmer
Disses Cart Use in Competitive Golf, Assoc. PRESS, July 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL
17821941 (noting Arnold Palmer's statement that golf carts are good for weekend
golfers, but not for use in competitive golf); Curtis Strange, Strange Views: Protecting
the Game, GOLF MAG., Mar. 1998, at 32 (stating that for "the good of the game" no
carts must be allowed on tour).
3. See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 2, at 807-08 (stating that courts should take
liberal interpretation of ADA and intimating that Martin was correctly decided);
Christopher M. Parent, Note, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 26J. LEGIS. 123, 136 (2000) (arguing that permitting Martin to
use golf cart is not proper application of ADA); Thomas Bonk, Much Is Riding on
Wheels ofJustice Jurisprudence, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1998, at Cl (noting United States
Senator Tom Harkin's statement that modifying PGA's no-cart rule for Martin is
reasonable accommodation under ADA and does not give Martin unfair advantage
over other players); Dole Supports Disabled Golfer, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Jan. 29,
1998, at DI (noting statement of then-U.S. Senator Bob Dole that "PGA does not
mean 'Please go away,"' and discussing Dole's support of Casey Martin); Terence
Moore, Ruling Allowing Martin to Use Cart Disregards the Essence of Golf, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Feb. 13, 1998, at E3 (disagreeing with district court's ruling in Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc., comparing ruling's significance to Marbury v. Madison and Brown v.
Bd. of Ed.). See generally Dina Marie Pascarelli, Note, Casey Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc.: A New Significance to a Golfer's Handicap, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 303 (1998) (examining district court's decision in Martin).
(171)
1
Holzbaur: Driving into the Rough: Conflicting Decisions on the Rights of Di
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 4 it was conceived to be the most
innovative and far-reaching federal civil rights legislation ever enacted on
behalf of disabled persons.5 The ADA's purpose was to protect all dis-
abled persons from all types of discrimination.6
Disabled athletes participating in major athletic competitions is not a
new development. 7 Recently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits decided cases involving disabled professional
golfers challenging their respective golf associations' rules regarding the
ability to ride a cart during tournaments. 8 On March 6, 2000, the Ninth
Circuit upheld a district court decision permitting Casey Martin, who has a
degenerative circulatory disorder in his right leg, to ride a golf cart during
PGA tournaments. 9 The Ninth Circuit's decision distinguished Martin as
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
5. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413,
413-14 (1991) (describing political leaders' opinions on enactment of ADA). At
the signing ceremony, President George H.W. Bush stated that "with today's sign-
ing of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child
with a disability can now pass through the once-closed doors into a bright new era
of equality, independence, and freedom." Id. at 414 n.3 (citing President George
Bush, Remarks by the President During Ceremony for the Signing of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 2 (July 26, 1990) (on file with the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review)).
6. See Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All ... The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 123-24 (1993-94) (discussing pur-
pose of ADA).
7. See Ted Curtis, 'Cart' Blanche?: A Decision Requiring Accommodation for a Dis-
abled Golfer Has Sports Lawyers Wondering What's Next, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 34 (dis-
cussing careers of professional baseball playerJim Abbott and professional football
player Kenny Walker). Jim Abbott, who was born absent a right hand and peti-
tioned the American League for permission to play with an oversized glove, had a
successful career as a pitcher in the major leagues for the New York Yankees and
Anaheim Angels. See id. (recounting Abbott's story). Kenny Walker enjoyed a suc-
cessful career with the Denver Broncos of the National Football League, despite
being deaf and requiring a sign language interpreter on the sidelines. See id. (re-
counting Walker's story).
8. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 69
U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 00-24) (holding that disabled golfer
Casey Martin was entitled to use golf cart during PGA Tour competitions); Olinger
v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
disabled golfer Ford Olinger was not entitled to use golf cart during United States
Open qualifying rounds). Casey Martin was the first disabled professional athlete
to sue an athletic association for violations under the ADA. See Kathleen Adams et
al., Milestones: Awarded, Casey Martin, TIME, Feb. 23, 1998, 11 (stating that Martin
was "the first professional athlete to sue successfully under the Americans [w]ith
Disabilities Act"); see also Mark Conrad, After Martin Decision, the Debate Rages On,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1998, at 5 (noting significance of Martin's case and its application of
ADA to Tour Rules); Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Penalty:
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. and Discriminatory Boundaries in the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 18 L. & INEQ. 131, 148 (2000) ("Casey Martin and Ford Olinger are the
only two athletes to claim that the ADA should apply to the playing of professional
sports.").
9. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1002 (intimating conclusion).
[Vol. 46: p. 171
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the first disabled professional athlete to successfully sue a sports league
under the ADA.10 The next day, the Seventh Circuit declared that Ford
Olinger, who also has a degenerative disorder that severely inhibits his
ability to walk, was not entitled to ride a golf cart during a United States
Golf Association ("USGA") competition, specifically the United States
Open qualifying rounds." The Ninth and Seventh Circuits disagreed as
to whether allowing disabled golfers to ride carts during tournaments fun-
damentally altered the nature of the competitions or was simply a reasona-
ble accommodation under the ADA.12
This Note discusses the Ninth and Seventh Circuit holdings in light of
other courts' decisions concerning the ADA. Part II summarizes the his-
tory of the ADA, including relevant caselaw regarding what amounts to a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 13 Part III describes how
Casey Martin and Ford Olinger attempted to challenge PGA and USGA
rules regarding carts.' 4 Part IV analyzes and critiques the reasoning used
by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in reaching their decisions and con-
cludes that the Seventh Circuit likely mischaracterized the effect of al-
lowing Olinger to ride a cart based on the nature of the competition.1 5
Finally, Part V focuses on the impact of Martin and Olinger and anticipates
what the United States Supreme Court may do now that it has granted the
PGA's petition for a writ of certiorari. 16
10. For a discussion about other sports associations and the ADA, see infra
notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
11. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007 (stating holding).
12. Compare Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000 (holding that permitting Martin to use
golf cart during Nike and PGA Tour events would not fundamentally alter nature
of competitions), with Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006 (concluding that district court's
decision allowing Olinger to ride golf cart during United States Open qualifying
rounds was not reasonable accommodation under ADA because it fundamentally
altered nature of competitions). See generally Patricia Manson, Disabled Golfer Here
Barred from Using Cart at U.S. Open, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 8, 2000, at 1 (noting
split in federal circuits on application of ADA to professional golf competitions).
13. For a further discussion of the development of disability law and the im-
plementation of the ADA, see infra notes 17-83 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the challenges that Casey Martin and Ford
Olinger proposed to their respective golf associations, see infra notes 84-127 and
accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits' reasoning and
conclusions, see infra notes 128-93 and accompanying text.
16. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No.
00-24) (granting certiorari). For a further discussion of the impact the conflicting
decisions in Martin and Olinger have had on the rights of the disabled and also the
Supreme Court's possible interpretation of the issues in Martin, see infra notes 194-
205 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Before the ADA was passed, several statutes provided limited protec-
tion for the rights of the disabled in the United States. 17 As the Civil
Rights Movement spread throughout the United States during the 1960s
and 19 7 0s, various legislation was proposed in an attempt to provide gov-
ernmental protection against discrimination based on race, sex and disa-
bility.' 8  Congress' first significant attempt to curtail disability
discrimination was its enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.19 Sec-
17. See Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin and the ADA's Reasona-
ble Accommodation Requirement in Competitive Settings, 77 OR. L. REv. 1337, 1341
(1998) (commenting that "[p]rior to the passage of the ADA, there was little to
prevent employers from discriminating against the disabled"); Parent, supra note
3, at 124-26 (discussing disability acts prior to passage of ADA). Congress first
addressed concerns over the rights of the disabled when it enacted the Act ofJune
10, 1948, which "prohibited employment discrimination based on physical handi-
caps within the United States Civil Service." Id. at 124 (citing Act of June 10, 1948,
Pub. L. No. 617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351). Congress passed the Act to assist veterans
disabled during World War II. See id. (describing congressional purpose behind
Act of June 10, 1948). In 1968, Congress passed the Architectural Barriers Act,
which "required buildings constructed, altered, or financed by the federal govern-
ment to be accessible to those with disabilities." Id. (citing Act of Aug. 12, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-480, § 1, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-
4157 (1988))).
18. See Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student-Athletes in the
1990's, 143 ED. L. REP. 1, 6-8 (2000) (discussing anti-discrimination legislation en-
acted prior to ADA). Two of the most important pieces of legislation arising out of
this movement were Title IX (prohibiting discrimination in education based on
sex) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (prohibiting discrimination
based on disability). See id. at 6 (describing statutes). Title IX provides: "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (a) (1994). See generally Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution:
Where We Are at the End of the Century, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2000) (discussing Title
IX's impact on leveling playing field for women).
19. SeeJason L. Thomas, Note, Through the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, High
School Athletes Are Saying "Put Me in Coach ": Sandison v. Michigan High School Ath-
letic Ass'n, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 727, 730-31 (1997) (describing Rehabilitation Act);
see also RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING
FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 1 (1984) (commenting that non-discrimination provi-
sions of Rehabilitation Act, found in section 504, are widely thought of "as the first
major civil rights legislation" protecting people with disabilities); W.S. Miller,
Ganden v. NCAA: How the NCAA 's Efforts to Clean Up Its Image Have Created an Ethi-
cal and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465, 467 (1997) ("[T] he Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 was the first piece of legislation which treated disabled Americans as a
whole, unified group, not merely separate groups based upon a person's particular
disability."). By enacting section 504, Congress hoped to achieve "the tragically
overdue goal of full integration of... handicapped [persons] into normal commu-
nity living, working, and service patterns." 118 CONG. REc. 3320 (1972) (statement
of Sen. Williams). Senator Hubert Humphrey commented that section 504 was
enacted to "firmly establish the right of [handicapped] Americans to dignity and
self-respect as equal and contributing members of society, and to end the virtual
[Vol. 46: p. 171
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tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provided that "[n]o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be...
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." 2
0
The Act prohibited all federal government employers and contractors
associated with the government from discriminating against persons with
disabilities. 2 1 Moreover, the Act's legal prerogative required "federally
funded programs to make reasonable accommodations of disabled per-
sons."22 Such employers and programs could not "limit, segregate, or clas-
sify applicants or employees or participants in any way that adversely
affected their opportunities or status because of handicap."23 The Act also
prohibited intentional discrimination as well as any actions or policies that
had a disproportionate impact on disabled persons.24 Under the Act, em-
ployers had to accommodate an employee's disability unless an employer
could demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on his or her operations. 25 Four elements comprised a cause of ac-
isolation of millions of children and adults from society." Id. at 32,310. Congress
"made a commitment to the handicapped that, to the maximum extent possible,
they shall be fully integrated into the mainstream of life in America." S. REP. No.
95-890, at 39 (1978).
20. Anna Phipps Engh, Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Focusing the Defini-
tion of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. RPv. 149, 149 (1988) (alteration
in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Similar standards
are applicable to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Clarkson v. Coughlin,
145 F.R.D. 339, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (equating proof required by ADA to proof
required by Rehabilitation Act section 504); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.103(a), 36.103(a)-(b)
(2000) (prescribing similar forms of proof).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994) (defining parties that are prohibited from
discriminating under Act).
22. Thomas, supra note 19, at 736. Various provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act require mandatory or prohibitive federal action. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 791(b)
(1994) (mandating federal agencies and departments adopt "affirmative action"
programs to hire, place and advance individuals with disabilities); 29 U.S.C.
§ 793(a) (1994) (providing that federal government must require private con-
tracting party to have affirmative action plan for disabled before awarding contract
for over $10,000); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting all federally assisted programs from
discriminating on basis of disability). Employers have an affirmative duty under
the Act to "make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant [or] employee." 29
C.F.R. § 32.13(a) (1994); see also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 288 (1987) (stating that court's necessary inquiry is "whether the employer
could reasonably accommodate the employee under the established standards").
23. 29 C.F.R. § 32.12(a)(2) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 32.12(b)(1)-(9) (2000)
(listing specific activities of employers subject to Rehabilitation Act).
24. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (refusing to hold that
all disparate-impact showings constitute prima facie case under Act). Instead, the
Court held that the Rehabilitation Act "reaches at least some conduct that has an
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped." Id.
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.13(b) (2000) (listing criteria to determine undue hard-
ship). In analyzing whether an accommodation would impose an undue burden,
the court should consider the following factors:
5
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tion under section 504.26 First, the plaintiff must have been "disabled"
under the definition provided by the Act.27 Second, the plaintiff must be
"otherwise qualified" for participation in the program or activity.28 Third,
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of
employees, number of participants, number and type of facilities, and size
of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and
structure of the recipient's workforce, and duration and type of training
program; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
Id. Reasonable accommodations do not include "mak[ing] 'fundamental' or 'sub-
stantial' modifications to accommodate the handicapped." Alexander, 469 U.S. at
300.
26. See, e.g., Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (clari-
fying "otherwise qualified" element for cause of action under Rehabilitation Act);
Wagner by Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating elements for cause of action under Rehabilitation Act); Bowers v. NCAA, 9
F. Supp. 460, 490 (D.N.J. 1998) (same); Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic
Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Conn. 1996) (same), vacated as moot 94
F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. Kan.
1995) (same); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 488
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (same), rev'd, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g.,Julia V.
Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age
Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 175, 177-81 (1997) (describing criteria for dis-
abled student athletes to establish prima facie case under Rehabilitation Act).
27. See Engh, supra note 20, at 149 (quoting Rehabilitation Act's definition of
disabled individual). Section 504 defines a handicapped individual as someone
who: "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8) (B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Rehabilitation Act protects essentially
the same disabilities as the ADA. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining
"disability"), with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (defining "indi-
vidual with a disability"). In 1992, Congress amended the wording of the Rehabili-
tation Act by substituting the language "a disability" for the term "handicaps." See
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102, S7(8), 106
Stat. 4344, 4348. "Handicap" was replaced with the word "disability" to reflect the
most currently acceptable terminology, but the same substantive meaning was re-
tained. See Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 n.17 (D. Neb. 1993)
(noting change in wording, but no change in substantive definition); 28 C.F.R. pt.
35, app. A, at 478-79 (2000) (attributing no change in definition or substance to
"phraseology" change); see also Robert John Maselek, Jr., Note, Employee Medical
Screening Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 653,
671 (1992) (discussing Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicap").
28. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 406 (holding that "'otherwise qualified person' is
one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap");
see also Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding "'otherwise qualified' person can perform the essential func-
tions of the job"); Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (empha-
sis added) (stating that "'otherwise qualified' . . . refers to a person who has the
abilities or characteristics sought by the grantee; but.., cannot refer only to those
[persons] already capable of meeting all the requirements ... or else no reasona-
ble requirement could ever violate" statute); Plummer by Plummer v. Branstad,
731 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting in making determination whether dis-
abled individuals are "otherwise qualified" to participate in program or activity in
6
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the plaintiff must have been excluded from participation in the program
or activity solely by reason of disability.2 9 Finally, the relevant program or
action under section 504, court examines "their physical, emotional, or psychologi-
cal abilities, their educational or experiential backgrounds, or their financial or
personal needs"). In addition, the federal regulations rephrased the description
to read "qualified [disabled] person." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k) (2000) (modifying
characterization of "otherwise qualified").
29. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387-91
(10th Cir. 1981) (holding that analysis under Rehabilitation Act was whether plain-
tiff was otherwise qualified individual who was excluded from program solely on
basis of his or her handicap; record indicated that plaintiff was qualified for psychi-
atric residency program apart from his multiple sclerosis and that defendants' rea-
sons for rejecting plaintiff "were based on incorrect assumptions or inadequate
factual grounds"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
stated the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Southeast-
ern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis.
1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he or
she was an otherwise qualified handicapped person apart from his handi-
cap, and was rejected under circumstances which gave rise to the infer-
ence that his rejection was based solely on his handicap.
2) Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, defendants have the bur-
den of going forward and proving that plaintiff was not an otherwise qual-
ified handicapped person, that is one who is able to meet all of the
program's requirements in spite of his handicap, or that his rejection
from the program was for reasons other than his handicap.
3) The plaintiff then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evi-
dence showing that the defendants' reasons for rejecting the plaintiff are
based on misconceptions or unfounded factual conclusions, and that rea-
sons articulated for the rejection other than the handicap encompass un-
justified consideration of the handicap itself.
Id. at 1387.
Despite the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Pushkin, few courts have attempted to
define the term "solely by reason of" disability. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1031 (not-
ing lack of explanation on third prong of section 504 inquiry). Due to the lack of
attention by the courts, courts dealing with this issue use two Supreme Court deci-
sions for guidance: Southeastern Community College v. Davis and Wimberly v. Labor &
Industrial Relations Commission. Southeastern Cmty. Coil. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979); Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987). See
Colleen M. Evale, Note, Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association:
The Sixth Circuit Sets Up Age Restrictions as Insurmountable Hurdles for Learning-Disabled
High School Student-Athletes, 5 SPORTS L.J. 109, 113 (1998) (noting that courts gener-
ally follow Supreme Court decisions in Davis and Wimberly to interpret "solely by
reason of disability" language under Rehabilitation Act). In Davis, the Court held
that section 504 requires that an otherwise qualified individual should not be ex-
cluded from participation in program "solely by reason of" his or her disability. See
Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 n.6 (interpreting "solely by reason of disability" prong of
section 504); Evale, supra, at 113-14 (examining Supreme Court's analysis in Da-
vis). In Wimberly, the Court relied in part on Davis and held that a Missouri statute
did not deny unemployment benefits solely on the basis of plaintiffs pregnancy.
See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 517-22 (evaluating Missouri statute and language of sec-
tion 504). Furthermore, a defendant's reasons to exclude a disabled person may
not be based on any stereotype about his disability, although the person's disability
can be considered when determining whether or not he is capable of performing
the program's requirements. See Pesterfield v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437,
443 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[tihe Rehabilitation Act forbids discrimination
based on stereotypes about a handicap, but it does not forbid decisions based on
7
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activity must have received federal financial assistance. 30
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 posed a problem, though, for disabled
plaintiffs working for private employers who were not subject to the Act's
protections. 31 Congress recognized that the Act left large groups of dis-
abled persons unprotected and subsequently enacted legislation attempt-
ing to address those areas not covered by the Act.32 Unfortunately, these
the actual attributes of the handicap"); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 407 n.7 (deciding
that some physical requirements may be legitimate prerequisites for participation
in program). One commentator noted that "[w]hen a disabled person is capable
of meeting [a] program's requirements, either with or without reasonable modifi-
cations, [the person] may not be excluded from a program simply because he is
disabled." Kasperski, supra note 26, at 181.
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994) (stating that section 504 applies to private
and public programs and activities, including those run by private and public edu-
cational institutions, when either institution or program receives some federal fi-
nancial assistance); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 400 (noting that petitioner was state
institution that received federal funds).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (defining applicable parties). The Act imposed dis-
similar burdens on employers, making its application for disabled employees in-
consistent. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794 (requiring private employers receiving federal
funds to make reasonable accommodations for their disabled workers), with 29
U.S.C. § 791 (1994) (requiring federal agencies to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for their disabled workers, but also requiring that federal agencies create
affirmative action plans to increase number of disabled workers they employ).
32. See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (now known
as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994)) (assisting "[s]tate and
local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of children handi-
capped in order to assure equal protection of the law"); Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994)) (awarding attorney's fees to prevailing parties in suits
brought to protect interests in development of early intervention services for in-
fants and toddlers); Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360aa-ee & 42 U.S.C. §§ 236, 241,
255, 262 (1994)) (encouraging development of orphan drugs through series of
economic incentives and special assistance with drug approval process, leading to
enormous increases in number of drugs that are available to treat rare diseases);
Technology-Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2288 (1994) (requiring states and territories to develop statewide,
consumer-responsive programs of technology-related services for individuals with
disabilities of all ages), repealed by Assistive Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-394, Title IV, § 401, 112 Stat. 3661 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3058 (1994 &
Supp. 1998)); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee
(1994)) (providing accessible voting places for federal elections); Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994 & Supp. 1998)) (providing that prisoner suits may be
stayed for ninety days to require exhaustion of grievance mechanism if procedures
are in compliance with requirements of law); Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1994)) (providing statutory assistance to challenge housing discrimination); De-
velopmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 98-527, 98
Stat. 2662 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994)) (provid-
ing federal funding to states that implement protection and advocacy program for
rights of individuals with developmental disabilities); Protection and Advocacy for
[Vol. 46: p. 171
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laws were "premised upon federal involvement in the programs and activi-
ties they cover[ed], i.e., the activities covered by the nondiscrimination
obligations [were] either those conducted by the federal government itself
or those funded in whole or in part by federal grants, contracts or other
forms of federal financial assistance." 33 As a result, activities and programs
not funded by the federal government were still able to discriminate
against the disabled. 34 Congress decided to combat the shortcomings of
the Rehabilitation Act and the gaps in the supplemental federal legislation
by enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.35
Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1994)) (providing protection and advocacy groups
access to records of mentally ill individuals); Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14705 (1994))
(prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities by all air carriers). It
should be noted, however, that these acts still only provided limited protection to
all disabled individuals. See Burgdorf, supra note 5, at 428-29 (examining federal
legislation enacted subsequent to Rehabilitation Act).
33. Burgdorf, supra, note 5 at 428-49. Two exceptions were the Air Carrier
Access Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. See id. at 429 (noting excep-
tions to disability statutes' requirement of federal financial assistance). Moreover,
"[iun the 1970s and 1980s, the absence of any federal statutory prohibition on
[disability] discrimination outside the federal sphere led advocates to propose
amendments to other titles of the civil rights laws." Id. Specifically, Burgdorf de-
scribes Representative Charles Vanik's attempts to amend Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "physical or mental
handicap." See id. at 429 n.88 (citing H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., (1st Sess. 1971); 117
CONG. REc. 45,945 (1971)).
34. See id. at 429 (explaining statutes' inability to protect disabled individuals
in private sector employment); see also THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, EN-
FORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 26-28 (1990) (discussing how federal laws prior to
ADA did not significantly reduce widespread discrimination against disabled).
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (prohibiting all discrimination
against persons with disabilities). Although the Rehabilitation Act made some pro-
gress in reducing disability discrimination, Congress recognized that the Rehabili-
tation Act missed much of the "day-to-day" discrimination faced by disabled
individuals; therefore, Congress enacted the ADA and extended the Rehabilitation
Act's anti-discrimination provisions to cover most of private sector employment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (4) (explaining that purpose of exercising congressional
authority was "to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peo-
ple with disabilities"); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (finding that disability dis-
crimination "still persists in such critical areas as employment in the private
sector"). Furthermore, "while most states have laws that prevent some forms of
discrimination against handicapped persons, these laws vary tremendously in
scope and effect, and in many-or most-cases provide merely superficial relief."
Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 923, 923 n.6 (1989); see also Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERE.
LEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 205 (1993) (noting that "[i]n addition to the federal
Rehabilitation Act, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted
laws prohibiting private sector employers from discriminating against individuals
with disabilities").
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B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 "to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 36 The ADA recog-
nized that physical and mental disabilities affect more than forty-three mil-
lion Americans whom society has tended to isolate and segregate because
of their disabilities.3 7 In passing the ADA, Congress concluded that de-
spite previously enacted legislation, more comprehensive protection was
needed because individuals with disabilities were a "discrete and insular
minority" subjected to purposeful unequal treatment and were also in a
position of political powerlessness. 38 Congress contemplated that the
United States should "assure equality of opportunity, full participation, in-
dependent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such [disabled] indi-
viduals."3 9 Congress also found that discrimination against the disabled
had a detrimental effect on the federal economy.
40
The ADA is divided into five separate titles.4 1 Title I prohibits dis-
crimination by any employer against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity. 4 2 Title II prohibits state or local entities that provide programs,
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1). Avote of 377 to 28 in the House of Representa-
tives and a vote of 91 to 6 in the Senate resulted in the passage of the ADA in July,
1990. See 136 CONG. REc. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (reporting House vote);
136 CONG. REc. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (reporting Senate vote). In at-
tempting to accomplish its goal, Congress proposed to "invoke the sweep of con-
gressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (4).
37. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D.
Ariz. 1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(1), (a)(2)). In Anderson, the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona held that under the ADA, the policy
of excluding little league baseball coaches in wheelchairs from being on the field
required an individualized assessment of the severity of the risk to players. See id.
at 345-46 (explaining holding). The court also stated that the discrimination
against plaintiff based on his disability was "clearly contrary to public policy as well
as to the interests of society as a whole." Id. at 345 (noting that discrimination
harms interests of plaintiff and other participants in little league activities).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (describing Congress' findings); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (a) (2) (noting inadequacy of prior legislation enacted to protect disabled
persons).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (explaining that "the continuing existence of
unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabili-
ties the opportunity to compete on an equal basis .... and costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity").
41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (1994) (enumerating Title I through Title V
of ADA).
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) (stating provisions). Title I estab-
lishes the general rule that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a quali-
fied individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
[Vol. 46: p. 171
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services or activities from discriminating against disabled individuals. 43 Ti-
tle III prohibits discrimination against the disabled in places of public ac-
commodation, commercial facilities and services offered by private
entities.44 Title IV covers telecommunication and common carrier accessi-
bility requirements for disabled persons.,45 Title V generally contains vari-
ous antidiscrimination provisions.
4 6
Unfortunately, the ADA has not been able to provide a solution for
every disability or address all of the potentially reasonable accommoda-
tions. 4 7 To assist employers and other entities in interpreting the ADA,
the Act requires the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to issue various regula-
tions and guidelines.48 The EEOC issues regulations and guidelines gov-
erning Title I, and the DOJ issues regulations covering Titles II and III.
4 9
Another important guide for interpretation under the ADA is the Rehabil-
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." Id. at § 12112(a).
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994) (stating provisions of Title II).
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994) (enumerating provisions of Title
III).
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (providing regulations for public transporta-
tion systems); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)-(C), 12184-12186 (providing regula-
tions for privately operated systems).
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994) (addressing miscellaneous provisions
and exemptions).
47. See Parent, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that instead of addressing all is-
sues, "the ADA offers broad definitions and systematic guidelines with which to
approach problems involving discrimination against disabled individuals").
48. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35-36 (2000) (enumerating DOJ regulations for public
non-transportation compliance with ADA's provisions, and for compliance by pri-
vate businesses providing goods and services); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2000) (providing
text of EEOC's regulations regarding employment compliance with provisions of
ADA); 49 C.F.R. § 37 (2000) (providing Department of Transportation's regula-
tions for compliance of transportation providers with ADA's provisions); see also W.
Kent Davis, Why Is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An Example of How the Amenricans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 7 (1998)
(discussing requirement that EEOC and DOJ promulgate regulations and guide-
lines for interpretation of ADA).
49. See Davis, supra note 48, at 7 (noting ADA's requirements); see also Diane
L. Kimberlin & Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and Update: What Has the
Supreme Court Done to Disability Law, 19 REv. LITIG. 579, 580 (2000) (describing
EEOC's responsibility for processing and investigating disability discrimination
charges brought under ADA). The exception to the ADA's requirement that the
DOJ and EEOC promulgate regulations is the Department of Transportation's is-
suance of regulations enforcing the transportation provisions of Title III. See Da-
vis, supra note 48, at 7 n.41 (discussing exception).
11
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itation Act of 1973.50 Both the PGA in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 5 1 and the
USGA in Olinger v. United States GolfAss'n52 argued that the golf courses on
which the competitions are held are not places of public accommodation
under Title III, and even if they were, permitting disabled golfers to ride
carts was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.53 Because
both cases focus solely on Title III of the ADA, the next section of this
Note will analyze that Title.
C. Title III
To establish a discrimination claim under Title III of the ADA, a
plaintiff must prove three elements. 54 First, the plaintiff must show that
he or she has a disability as defined under the ADA.55 Second, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the defendant is a "private entity" engaged in
the ownership, leasing or operation of a place of "public accommoda-
tion."56 Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the entity denied the
plaintiff access to the accommodation because of his or her disability.57
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (providing that agencies coordinate ADA stan-
dards with Rehabilitation Act standards so as not to produce inconsistent or con-
flicting requirements); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 n.2 (8th Cir.
1995) (noting that because standards under both acts are largely similar, cases
construing one statute are instructive in construing other); Vande Zande v. Wis.
Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353, 359 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (noting that ADA was to
be interpreted "consistently with the Rehabilitation Act"), affd, 44 F.3d 538, 542
(7th Cir. 1995); see also ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DIscRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 39 (1995) (noting Rehabilitation Act of 1973 laid "conceptual
foundation" for ADA).
51. 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000).
52. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
53. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005-06 (discussing USGA's arguments); Martin,
204 F.3d at 996-98 (describing PGA's arguments).
54. See Mary Carol Joly, Doe and Smith v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-
pany: The Possible Impact of Insurance Caps on HIV-Infected Individuals, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 193, 203-04 (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)-(b) (1994)); see
also Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 480 (D.N.J 1998) (explaining require-
ments for Title III claim). Section 12182 provides as a general rule that "[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a) (1994).
55. SeeJoly, supra note 54, at 203; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (describing
rule prohibiting discrimination by public accommodation).
56. Joly, supra note 54, at 203; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (describing rule
prohibiting discrimination by public accommodation).
57. Joly, supra note 54, at 203-04; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (describing rule
prohibiting discrimination by public accommodation).
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A plaintiff has standing under the ADA if he or she falls within the
ADA's definition of "disabled."58 One problem facing potential ADA
plaintiffs is that often it is difficult to prove that they suffer from a disabil-
ity recognized by the ADA.5 9 Under the ADA, disability is defined as "(A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."60 The deter-
mination as to whether an individual is "disabled" will be made on a case-
by-case basis.6 1 The DOJ defines a physical and mental impairment as
"[a] ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or an-
atomical loss . . . [and] [a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities," among others.62 The regulations also
define "major life activities" to include "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working." 63 Even if an individual is not currently im-
paired, he or she still may qualify as disabled under the ADA if that person
has a history of disabilities. 64 An individual also qualifies as disabled if a
58. See Davis, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that plaintiff must prove he or she is
disabled under ADA).
59. See id. (noting that proving disability under ADA can be burdensome and
confusing for plaintiffs).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
61. SeeJoly, supa note 54, at 201 (noting that courts make case-by-case evalua-
tion of claims under ADA).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2000). Also included as physical and mental impair-
ments are "such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as ortho-
pedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism." Id. Homosexu-
ality and bisexuality are not impairments under Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)
(1994) ("For purposes of the definition of 'disability' in section 12102(2) of this
title, homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments and as such are not disa-
bilities under this chapter.").
63. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. The ADA requires that the impairment "substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (concluding that
reproduction is "major life activity" under ADA). See generally Sean Baker, Com-
ment, The Casey Martin Case: Its Possible Effects on Professional Sports, 34 TULSA LJ.
745, 762 (1999) (noting that courts construe scope of major life activity ambigu-
ously in cases in which courts require fulfillment of all three elements of ADA's
definition of disability); Parent, supra note 3, at 128 (discussing difficulty of defin-
ing whether impairment limits major life activity due to ADA's vague language and
varying interpretations by courts).
64. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that people qualified as disabled include "people who have recovered
from previously disabling conditions (cancer or coronary disease, for example) but
who may remain vulnerable to the fears and stereotypes of their employers"). To
establish that an employee has a history of disabilities, the employee must provide
NOTE
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private entity perceives him or her as disabled. 65 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court qualified the disability definition by limiting the ADA to
those individuals for whom medications or some other measure can cor-
rect or control their disabilities. 66
2. Place of Public Accommodation
The ADA limits Title III claims to those in which the defendant owns,
leases or operates a place of public accommodation. 67 ADA section
sufficient documentation showing that he or she has a history of, or has been mis-
classified as, being disabled. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 794 (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 ("The phrase
has a record of such an impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as
having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more ma-
jor life activities."). Courts have rendered documentation insufficient when the
employer knows and acknowledges that an employee suffers from an impairment,
but the employer also expects the employee to return to work after adequately
healing. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that "[employer's] mere knowledge of [employee's] heart attack, cou-
pled with the sending of a get-well card and note about her job duties" does not
constitute sufficient record of impairment under ADA).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (b) (defining disability to mean "being regarded
as having such an impairment"); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (same). The DOJ defines "re-
garded as having an impairment' as follows:
The phrase is regarded as having an impairment means-
(i) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but that is treated by a private entity as constitut-
ing such a limitation;
(ii) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impair-
ment; or
(iii) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (1) of this defi-
nition but is treated by a private entity as having such an impairment.
28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
66. SeeJoly, supra note 54, at 201 nn.63-64 (explaining that Supreme Court
recently held ADA applies only to those individuals with "substantial limitations
after any mitigating medical measures are in place"). Joly discusses the Supreme
Court's decisions in three cases: Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999);
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); and Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). See id. (discussing cases). Joly notes that in each of
these cases, the Court considered "examples of mitigating measures including cor-
rective lenses, and blood pressure medication." See id. (describing cases). Joly
states that:
The Court advised that the inquiry into whether a specific mitigating
measure constituted a 'corrected condition' should be made on a case by
case basis, and pointed out that prong three of the definition of disability
or the 'regarded as' prong would still be a valid context within which to
bring an ADA claim.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994) (stating requirement that defendant own,
lease or operate place of public accommodation). Section 12189 also provides
that "[a] ny person that offers examinations or courses related to applications, li-
censing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education,
professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place
and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible
14
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12181(7) provides an extensive list of facilities that qualify as places of
public accommodation. 68 Nevertheless, this language provides limited
guidance to courts as to whether the defendant "operates a place of public
accommodation," because the ADA does not provide a definition, and the
language itself is ambiguous. 69 Public accommodations are generally de-
fined as physical places.70 In a few cases individuals have asserted unsuc-
cessfully that particular sports entities are places of public
arrangements for such individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (1994); see also Davis, supra
note 48, at 12 n.72 (noting that section 12189 was relevant to district court's rea-
soning in favor of Casey Martin because PGA conducts qualifying school for play-
ers wishing to join professional tour).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (providing list of places of public accom-
modation). Section 12187 defines the following private entities as places of public
accommodations provided that these "entities affect commerce":
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an
establishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theatre, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an ac-
countant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgradu-
ate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place
of exercise or recreation.
Id. (emphasis added). Congress intended that this list of public accommodations
be exhaustive. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.4, at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 545 (discussing intention that readers of provision consider
stated categories of public accommodations exhaustive).
69. See Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating that
"phrase 'operates a place of public accommodation' is not clear and unambigu-
ous," and therefore DOJ's interpretation of phrase is "helpful").
70. See Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that
public accommodation must be "physical place") (citing Ford v. Shering-Plough
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998)) (holding that public accommodation must
be "place"); see also Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that public accommodation must be "physical place"). But see
Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., Inc.,
37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring that public accommodation is not limited
to "actual physical structures").
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accommodation. 7' On the other hand, favorable results have occurred in
suits by college students against the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion ("NCAA").72
3. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability
After establishing that the private entity is a public accommodation or
owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant discriminated against him or her in
a manner prohibited under Title III. 7 3 Title III outlines five types of dis-
crimination that are sufficient to satisfy an ADA claim.74 First, the private
entities, including owners, lessors, lessees and operators of places of public
accommodation, must impose "eligibility criteria" that select disabled indi-
viduals. 75 Second, private entities must fail "to make reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices, or procedures" affecting "goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" to disabled individu-
als. 76 These modifications, however, must not "fundamentally alter the
71. See Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that National Football League, its member club and media are not "'places' of
public accommodation" under Title III of ADA); Cortez v. NBA, 960 F. Supp. 113,
116 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (concluding that National Basketball Association ("NBA") is
not operator of place of public accommodation and did not exercise control over
conduct complained of by plaintiffs); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding national and local hockey organizations are not "places
of public accommodation" under ADA because they are only organizations); see
also Baker, supra note 63, at 757-62 (discussing decisions in Stoutenborough, Elitt and
Cortez and noting relevance of cases to Martin's case).
72. See Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1121 (determining that NCAA "operates a place
of public accommodation" in light of its significant control over athletic facilities
of member institutions); Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 483, 489 (holding that NCAA was
not "place of public accommodation," but it possibly operated place of public ac-
commodation); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96C-6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 21, 1996) (denying student's request for preliminary injunction, but finding
that ADA may apply to NCAA). In Ganden, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois stated that if a membership organization has a close
connection to a particular facility, the organization could possibly be classified as a
place of public accommodation for purposes of Title III of the ADA. See id. at *10
(discussing possibility that Title III of ADA applies to membership organization).
The Ganden court determined that for plaintiff to demonstrate a close connection,
plaintiff must prove that "(1) the organization is affiliated with a particular facility,
and (2) membership in (or certification by) that organization acts as a necessary
predicate to use of the facility." Id.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (1994) (designating what constitutes dis-
crimination under Title III of ADA); Davis, supra note 48, at 12 (noting that dis-
abled individual must prove that he or she suffered discrimination in manner
prohibited by Title III).
74. See 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v) (stating what constitutes
discrimination).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (i) (prohibiting entity from establishing
screening criteria to discriminate against disabled).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (stating that private entity discriminates
against disabled individuals unless reasonable modifications are made).
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nature of such ... accommodations." 77 Third, private entities must fail to
incorporate necessary measures to ensure that "no individual with a disa-
bility is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differ-
ently. . . because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services."7 8 These
measures need not be taken when implementing them would "fundamen-
tally alter the nature of such ... accommodation being offered or would
result in an undue burden."79 Fourth, the private entities must fail "to
remove existing architectural, and communication barriers that affect ac-
cess for disabled persons when such removal is "'readily achievable.', 8 0
Finally, even if removal of the architectural or communication barriers is
not "readily achievable," discrimination still can occur if the private enti-
ties fail to provide "accommodations .. .through alternate methods if
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (A) (ii)-(iii) (requiring that private entity make
reasonable modifications and provide any necessary auxiliary aids and services un-
less entity can demonstrate that modifications will "fundamentally alter the nature
of such goods, services, facilities . . .or accommodations").
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii) (prohibiting exclusion or denial of ser-
vices to disabled individuals); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining auxiliary aids
and services to include interpreters for hearing impaired, readers for visually im-
paired and other similar services); People v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, 877 F.
Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing claim filed by New York State Attorney
General alleging that defendants discriminated by refusing to provide sign lan-
guage interpreters at medical examinations).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii) (stating that owner, lessor, lessee or oper-
ator is required to make reasonable modifications unless entity can show that mod-
ifications will impose "undue burden"); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2000). (listing factors
for determining whether modification would impose undue burden).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iv) (providing requirement that entities re-
move barriers for disabled if "readily achievable"). Section 12181 defines "readily
achievable" as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much dif-
ficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (1994). Section 12181 also provides fac-
tors to consider when determining if the modification is readily achievable:
(A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter;
(B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect
on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon
the operation of the facility;
(C) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, includ-
ing the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (A)-(D). See generally Fiedler v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F.
Supp. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that defendant acknowledged "that dispersion
of wheelchair seating throughout [the cinema] is 'readily achievable"'); Karen E.
Field, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act "Readily Achievable" Requirementfor Bar-
rier Removal: A Proposal for the Allocation of Responsibility Between Landlord and Tenant,
15 CARDozo L. REv. 569 (1993) (discussing cost concerns of removing barrier be-
tween landlord and tenant).
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such methods are "readily achievable."8 1 Whether the modification is rea-
sonable depends on the facts of the case and the balance between the
"efficacy of the modification .. . [and the] cost of implementation."8 2
Generally, "[a] modification will be deemed unreasonable if, when look-
ing at the overall operations, it alters the essential nature of the facility
and a financial burden will result."
83
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (v) (requiring alternative methods if initial
proposal to modify architectural and communication barriers is not "readily
achievable").
82. Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1995) (describ-
ing balancing test to determine whether modification is reasonable); Joly, supra
note 54, at 207 (evaluating requirements of reasonable modification). The reason-
able modification analysis under Tide III is parallel to the reasonable modification
analysis of the ADA's other tides. See Joly, supra note 54, at 355-56 (discussing
reasonable modification analysis); see also Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel
Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that no difference exists
between burden of proof under Title I and Title III claims because of similarity in
statutory language). Finally, "due to the fact-specific nature of the necessary in-
quiry, the question of whether a modification is reasonable will generally be one
which has to be answered at trial and not at the summary judgment stage." Joly,
supra note 54, at 207 (citing Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.
1996)); see also Staron, 51 F.3d at 356 (stating that "the determination of whether a
particular modification is 'reasonable' involves a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry
that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light
of the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the organization that
would implement it"); Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (noting that reasonableness requirement is "fact question").
Another factor the courts must consider when balancing the "efficacy of the
modification . . . [and the] cost of implementation" is whether the modification
will impose a direct threat to the health and safety of others. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(3) (stating individual cannot request modification "where such indi-
vidual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others"); see also Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (noting that "existence, or nonexistence of a
significant risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses
the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on...
objective evidence"). Plaintiffs often pursue their cases under section 12182(b) (3)
because defendants fail to assess a disabled person's individual capacities. Cf An-
derson v. Little League Baseball, 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992) (concluding
that individualized assessment of disabled person's capabilities is required before
disabled individual is excluded as threat to other's safety). Instead, defendants
make generalized assessments of what disabled individuals can and cannot do
based on class stereotypes. Cf Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 287 (1987) (discussing necessity of individualized inquiry and making appro-
priate findings of fact); Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345 (same). But see McPherson v.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
individualized determination when it would impose undue burden on athletic as-
sociation to sort out legitimate from non-legitimate requests for waivers of eight
semester rule).
83. Joly, supra note 54, at 207; see also Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d
Cir. 1994) ("The test to determine the reasonableness of a modification is whether
it alters the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or hard-
ship in light of the overall program"). See generally Sandison v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (defining reasonable modification as
one connoting moderate change).
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
Casey Martin is a professional golfer who suffers from Klippel-
Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome.84 Because of this disorder, Martin endures
severe pain and atrophy in his right leg.85 This affliction renders Martin
unable to walk for extended periods of time.
86
The PGA is a non-profit association of professional golfers. 87 The
PGA supports three competitive tours: (1) the PGA Tour; (2) the Nike
Tour; and (3) the Senior PGA Tour.88 Golfers qualify for the PGA Tour
or the Nike Tour by competing in a competition known as the qualifying
school. 89 At that competition, the best finishers qualify for the PGA Tour,
and the next-best finishers qualify for the Nike Tour.
90
In 1997, Martin attempted to qualify for the PGA Tour by competing
in the qualifying school.91 The rules of the competition permit partici-
pants to use golf carts only during the first two rounds of the competi-
tion.9 2 Martin used a golf cart and played well enough to qualify for the
third and final round of the competition. 93 Martin then requested that
the PGA Tour allow him to use a cart for the final round. 94 The PGA
84. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000) (describ-
ing Martin's ailment). Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome is "a congenital, de-
generative circulatory disorder" that has resulted in a malformation of [Martin's]
right leg." Id. (explaining syndrome's effect on Martin).
85. See id. (noting Martin's discomfort resulting from disorder).
86. See id. (describing difficulties Martin experiences while walking). By walk-
ing, Martin runs the risk of his leg fracturing or hemorrhaging. See id. (consider-
ing possible risks).
87. See id. (describing PGA).
88. See id. (describing PGA's three competitive tours). The Nike Tour is a
step down from the PGA Tour, and the Senior PGA Tour permits only professional
golfers age fifty and over. See id. (discussing Nike Tour and Senior Tour). Senior
Tour players are permitted to use carts during competition. See id. at 996 n.4 (not-
ing Senior PGA Tour policy). In 1999, Nike Co. ended its sponsorship of the Nike
Tour, and the tour is now named the Buy.Com Tour. SeeJohn Reger, PGA Develop-
mental Tour Gets New Sponsor, Name, ORANGE CouNYr REG., Oct. 26, 1999, at D14
(describing change in sponsorship and name). Nevertheless, this Note will refer to
the tour as the Nike Tour.
89. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 996 (discussing qualifying school). The qualifying
school consists of three stages. See id. (explaining qualifying school). Players are
permitted to use golf carts during the first two stages; however, in the third stage,
and in the PGA and the Nike Tours themselves, players are required to walk the
courses. See id. (describing permittable cart use during qualifying school).
90. See id. (explaining how tours receive their players). Nike Tour players
.may qualify for the PGA Tour by winning three Nike Tour tournaments in one
year or by being in the top fifteen money-winners in the Nike Tour." Id.
91. See id. (discussing Martin's attempt to qualify for PGA tour through quali-
fying school).
92. See id. (explaining that rules limit use of golf carts at certain points at
qualifying school).
93. See id. (noting Martin's results at qualifying school).
94. See id. (stating Martin's request and PGA's response).
2001] NOTE
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Tour denied his request. 95 Martin filed suit against the PGA Tour in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, claiming that the
denial of his request violated the ADA. 96 The district court issued a tem-
porary restraining order, thereby permitting Martin to use a golf cart dur-
ing the final round. 97 Martin played well enough to qualify for a spot on
the 1998 Nike Tour.98 Subsequently, the district court granted partial
summary judgment for Martin and held that the PGA "owns, operates and
leases golf courses, which the ADA identifies as places of public accommo-
dation."9 9 A bench trial followed, after which the district court held that
the PGA violated the ADA because "modifying the walking rule for Martin
was a reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter the na-
ture of PGA golf tournaments."'10 0 The court then issued a permanent
injunction requiring the PGA to permit Martin to use a golf cart in the
PGA Tour and the Nike Tour, and in any qualifying rounds for those
tours. 10 1 The PGA appealed the district court's ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 10 2
B. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n
Ford Olinger is a professional golfer who aspired to compete in the
United States Open ("U.S. Open"). 10 3 Olinger suffers from bilateral avas-
cular necrosis, a degenerative condition that affects his ability to walk.10 4
The USGA is a private, non-profit association of member golf clubs
and golf courses.' 0 5 The USGA legally controls only its own champion-
ships.10 6 Nevertheless, the golf community regards the USGA as the gov-
95. See id. (explaining PGA's response).
96. See id. (describing Martin's suit under ADA).
97. See id. (discussing district court's order that allowed Martin to use golf
cart).
98. See id. (describing Martin's success in qualifying by using golf cart in final
round).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 996-97.
101. See id. at 997 (describing permanent injunction allowing Martin to ride
cart in Nike Tour and PGA Tour tournaments).
102. See id. (noting appeal).
103. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1001 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting Olinger's attempt to qualify for U.S. Open). In 1988, Olinger re-
ceived his professional title by certification from the PGA. See id. (describing Olin-
ger's status as professional golfer).
104. See id. (stating Olinger's condition).
105. See id. at 1002 (discussing United States Golf Association ("USGA")).
The USGA was chartered for "the purpose of promoting and conserving the best
interests and the true spirit of the game of golf." Id.
106. See id. (describing extent of USGA's control). Each year the USGA con-
ducts championships in thirteen designated categories, including the U.S. Ama-
teur, U.S. Senior Open and U.S. Women's Open. See id. (listing tournaments
provided by USGA).
[Vol. 46: p. 171
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/5
erning body of golf in the United States.10 7 The USGA promotes the
integrity of the game of golf and produces an official Rules of Go/f.1°8
The USGA conducts the U.S. Open each year to determine the men's
national championship of golf in the United States. 10 9 Each year, the
venue for the U.S. Open differs. 110 Over 7000 players usually submit U.S.
Open applications."' Each player must meet USGA qualifications to play
in local qualifying rounds. 112 Golfers who qualify from the local qualify-
ing rounds are sent-to sectional qualifying rounds."l 3 About 100 golfers
will get past the sectional qualifiers to gain a spot in the U.S. Open
field."l 4 Golfers participating in the U.S. Open face a stiff challenges-
the U.S. Open is arguably "the greatest test in golf."
1115
The Rules of Golfgovern the qualifying, sectional and final rounds of
U.S. Open competition."l 6 The rules do not expressly prohibit the use of
107. See id. (noting reputation of USGA).
108. UNITED STATES GOLF AsSOcIATION, OFFIciAL RuLEs OF GOLF, 2000-2001
(2000). The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland ("R&A"), is
also responsible for the creation of the Rules of Golf See id. (commenting on R&A's
contribution to Rules of Gol). The court stated that the Rules of Golf is a "staple in
the bag of all true golfers." Id.
109. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1002 (discussing U.S. Open). "The U.S. Open
has been conducted yearly since 1895, with the exception of the war years 1917-
1918 and 1942-45." Id.
110. See id. (describing U.S. Open venues). This year the U.S. Open was con-
tested at the Pebble Beach Golf Course in California. See Dan Jenkins, A League of
His Own: Tiger Woods Turns the 100th U.S. Open into a Runaway, GOLF DIGEST, Au-
gust 2000, at 161 (describing Tiger Woods' win at 2000 U.S. Open conducted at
Pebble Beach).
111. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1002 (noting number of yearly U.S. Open
applicants).
112. See id. (explaining U.S. Open qualifications). All professional golfers
and amateur golfers who carry at least a 1.4 certified USGA handicap index are
able to play in local qualifying rounds. See id. (describing participants eligible for
U.S. Open qualifying).
113. See id. (discussing sectional qualifying rounds). In May, the local qualify-
ing rounds are conducted, which will decrease the field of 7000 golfers down to
about 750 participants for sectional qualifying. See id. (stating typical results of
local qualifying). Local and sectional qualifying occur at different golf courses
every year. See id. (noting that USGA uses variety of venues for qualifiers as well as
its championships).
114. See id. (stating number of sectional qualifying participants that proceed
to U.S. Open tournament). These one-hundred golfers will join approximately
sixty players who were exempt from participating in preliminary qualifying because
of certain published criteria. See id. (describing makeup of U.S. Open field).
115. See id. at 1002-03 (commenting on difficulty of competition in U.S.
Open). For U.S. Open competition, the USGA maintains the host golf course in
difficult conditions. See id. at 1003 (noting USGA's maintenance of U.S. Open
venues). The USGA narrows the course's fairways, heightens the rough around
the fairways and cuts the greens so tight that the greens often are lightning fast.
See id. (illustrating different course conditions that make U.S. Open championship
wearisome for its participants).
116. See id. (describing governing rules for U.S. Open competition). The
Rules of Golf consists of 34 separate rules and appendices that total 144 pages. See
NOTE20011
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golf carts during competitions; however, the rules do allow the tourna-
ment competition committees to establish the conditions for an event, in-
cluding whether or not to preclude the use of carts by participants.'
17
Since 1955, "the entry forms for every U.S. Open include a provision stat-
ing that '[p]layers shall walk at all times during a stipulated round."' 1 18 A
similar prohibition is in effect for all but two of the thirteen national
championships that the USGA conducts. 1 19 The USGA lacks an estab-
lished procedure for waiving the prohibition against carts. 120 Addition-




Olinger applied to play in the 1998 U.S. Open and requested that the
USGA waive its prohibition against the use of carts. 122 The USGA rejected
Olinger's request, and Olinger sued under the ADA four days before local
qualifying began in South Bend, Indiana. 123 The United States District
Court for the District of Indiana granted Olinger a temporary restraining
order, thereby allowing Olinger to ride a cart during the local qualifier.
124
id. (describing content of Rules of Golo. For further clarification, the USGA pub-
lishes hundreds of interpretations of the rules, applying them to different facts and
circumstances. See id. (explaining USGA's publication of interpretations). The
Rules of Golf sets forth the physical restrictions on golf clubs and balls, identifies the
number of different clubs players may use during a round and governs golfers'
behavior while playing. See id. (listing various requirements that Rules of Golf
governs).
117. See id. (citing Rule 8, USGA Official Rules of Golf, 1999-2000). Moreover,
players in each USGA championship receive a set of "Local Rules and Conditions
of Competition for USGA Championships" and a "Notice to Competitors" that pro-
nounces the local rules adopted by the USGA Championship Committee. See id.
(explaining that U.S. Open participants receive supplemental rules).
118. Id. "The USGA requires competitors to walk the course because it be-
lieves that their physical endurance and stamina are important parts of the compe-
tition." Id.
119. See id. at 1002 n.5 (noting USGA's use of rule in other competitions).
The USGA permits competitors to use carts in the U.S. Senior Amateur and the
U.S. Senior Women's Amateur. See id. (discussing lack of walking requirement in
two USGA-sponsored competitions).
120. See id. at 1003 (noting absence of procedure). One commentator noted
that "since 1986 the USGA has received twelve requests from eleven different [golf-
ers] seeking waivers of the prohibition against using carts in the U.S. Open." Id.
121. See id. (recognizing that only one participant has used cart during U.S.
Open); see alsoJoseph Huber, Golf Cart Use and Individuals with Disabilities-Will the
PGA Tour Ask the Supreme Court, PALAEsTRA, Mar. 22, 2000, at 57 (noting that in
1998, Casey Martin became first player to ride cart while playing in U.S. Open).
122. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004 (describing Olinger's application and
request).
123. See id. (explaining USGA's response to Olinger's request and Olinger's
subsequent action).
124. See id. (describing Olinger's request and court's grant of temporary re-
straining order).
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Nevertheless, Olinger failed to advance to the sectionals.12 5 After a full
trial, the district court ruled in favor of the USGA. 126 Olinger appealed




1. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit began by analyzing whether the host golf courses of
the PGA Tour and the Nike Tour events are places of public accommoda-
tion subject to Title III of the ADA.128 The court first examined the terms
of the ADA and the statute's basic anti-discrimination clause. 129 After not-
ing various types of private entities that qualify as public accommodations
for purposes of Title III, the court stated that golf courses are clearly
"places of public accommodation" under Title 111.130
The court then rejected the PGA's arguments that a golf course dur-
ing a PGA tournament is not a place of public accommodation.1 3 1 First,
the court rejected the PGA's assertion that the competitor's area "behind
the ropes" is not a place of public accommodation because the public may
not enter it during tournaments.' 3 2 The court also stated that cases in-
125. See Golfer Uses Cart in U.S. Open Qualifier, TuLSA WoRLD, May 19, 1998, at 5
(stating that Olinger failed to qualify for U.S. Open after shooting eighty-three,
which placed him eighteen shots behind leader).
126. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004 (noting district court conclusion that fa-
vored USGA).
127. See id. at 1001 (discussing procedural history of case).
128. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyz-
ing courses as places of public accommodation). The district court held that, as a
matter of law, Title III of the ADA applied to the PGA and the Nike Tour competi-
tions. See id. (restating district court holding).
129. See id. (examining ADA). The court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) is
the basic anti-discrimination clause for Title III of the ADA. See id. (restating
statute).
130. See id. ("There is nothing ambiguous about [42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (L)];
golf courses are places of public accommodations."). Section 12181(7) (L) defines
the following private entities as places of public accommodation: "a gymnasium,
health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation." 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
131. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 997 (rejecting PGA's argument).
132. See id. (refusing to adopt PGA's assertion that area "behind the ropes" is
not place of public accommodation). The court determined that the PGA's argu-
ment was not meritorious because it too narrowly construed the nature of what is a
place of public accommodation under the ADA. See id. (describing problems with
PGA's argument). The court agreed that the general public was not allowed "in-
side the ropes" during tournaments, but noted that "competitors, caddies, and
certain other personnel can [enter the area]." Id. The court reasoned that even if
a golf course during a tournament is not being used as a "place of exercise or
recreation" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (L), the course is at least a
"place of exhibition or entertainment" and therefore qualifies as a place of public
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volving disabled student athletes held that Title III applied to the playing
field, not just to the stands. 133 Next, the court disagreed with the PGA's
contention that it may compartmentalize golf courses during tourna-
ments.134 The court rejected the PGA's statement that its compartmental-
izing is analogous to either a "mixed use facility" or a factory that allows
public tours. 135 Finally, the court disregarded PGA's assumption that
there is nothing public about the competition itself.13 6 The court refused
accommodation. See id. (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (C) includes "'[a] thea-
ter.... stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment"' in its definition of
"'public accommodation"' (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C))). The court deter-
mined that the ADA "does not restrict [the] definition [of "public accommoda-
tion"] to "portions of the place of exhibition that are open to the general public."
Id. The court noted that the facility does not lose its status as a public accommoda-
tion simply because entry to a part of the facility is limited, such as to the executive
suites contracted by businesses in an arena. See id. at 997-98 (explaining rationale
and citing Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D. Or.
1997)).
133. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 998 (explaining that cases exist consistent with its
rationale and citing Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483-90 (D.NJ. 1998); Tatum
v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96C-6953,
1996 WL 680000, at *8-11; Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342,
344 (D. Ariz. 1992)).134. See id. (disagreeing with PGA's argument that it compartmentalizes golf
courses during tournaments).
135. See id. (rejecting PGA's analogy). PGA argued that a large hotel with a
separate residential wing was analogous to the golf course while PGA operated a
golf tournament. See id. (stating PGA's argument). The Ninth Circuit explained
that the separate residential wing is not a place of public accommodation, but the
hotel wing is a place of public accommodation because it falls under the definition
of public accommodation in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (A) (1994). See id. (comparing
separate residential wing to hotel wing under Title III); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7) (A) (defining "an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging" as places
of public accommodation). The court determined that in the hotel example, the
separate residential wing of the hotel was not being used as a hotel; however, the
golf course during a tournament is still being used as a golf course. See Martin, 204
F.3d at 998 (distinguishing separate residential wing of hotel from golf course dur-
ing tournament).
Furthermore, the court also rejected the PGA's second attempt to distinguish
its golf courses from places of public accommodation. See id. (determining PGA's
second example also lacked merit). PGA argued that their operation of a golf
course during tournaments was analogous to a commercial facility-such as a fac-
tory-that allows public tours at specific places and times, which are not consid-
ered places of public accommodation. See id. (noting PGA's factory example).
The court stated that this example is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the court
stated that the executive order exempting factories is "only applicable to commer-
cial facilities 'not otherwise a place of public accommodation."' Id. (citing 28
C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. B, at 624 (1999)). Moreover, the court explained that this
example would only be analogous if Martin were a spectator who attempted to ride
a cart through the competitor's area of the tournament. See id. (stating second
reason for refusing to adopt PGA's analogy).
136. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 998-99 (disagreeing with PGA's claim that tour is
not public). PGA argued that because of the highly selective process they use to
allow golfers to qualify for the tour, the courses on which those qualified golfers
play tournaments could not be places of public accommodation. See id. at 998
(noting PGA's argument). The court explained that solely because users of a facil-
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"to draw a line beyond which the performance of athletes becomes so ex-
cellent that a competition restricted to their level deprives its situs of the
character of a public accommodation."
13 7
After deciding that the golf courses during PGA tournaments are
places of public accommodation, the court addressed the issue of whether
allowing Martin to ride a cart was a reasonable accommodation under Ti-
tle II.138 The court first concluded that allowing Martin to use a cart is
reasonable under the ADA. 139 The court affirmed the district court's find-
ing that Martin's use of a golf cart is necessary because his disability makes
it almost impossible for him to walk the course. 140 The court next deter-
mined that walking is not fundamental to the general game of golf.
1 4 1
ity are highly selected, it does not follow that the facility is not a place of public
accommodation. See id. (dismissing PGA's theory). The court's reasoning analo-
gized Title III's coverage of "secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
schools." See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J)). Although competition between
students wishing to attend private schools is intense, the high level of competition
does not remove the universities from Title III's application. See id. (examining
competition between students). The court determined that the students admitted
to the schools are members of the public and use the universities as places of
public accommodation. See id. (noting treatment of university). Finally, the court
stated that Title III does not provide "access to a place where the individual is not
entitled to be; the rejected applicant for admission is not entitled to access to the
university, and the spectator is not entitled to access to the tees, fairways and
greens during a PGA golf tournament." Id. at 999 n.7.
137. Id. at 999. The court noted that "[a)ny member of the public who pays a
$3,000 entry fee and supplies two letters of recommendation may try out in the
qualifying school." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the golf courses on
which the selection of PGA golfers begins are places of public accommodation. See
id. (concluding initial qualifying courses are places of public accommodation).
The court also rejected drawing a distinction between use of a place of public
accommodation for pleasure and use in the pursuit of a living. See id. (stating
refusal to draw lines).
138. See id. (analyzing reasonable accommodation issue). Title III also de-
fines discrimination as:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such mod-
ifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1994).
139. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 999 (concluding that use of cart is reasonable).
The court stated that permitting Martin to use a cart would solve Martin's problem
of access to the competition, and because carts are used in other competitions,
such as on the senior tour, it would not be a practical difficulty for PGA to allow
their use in PGA Tour competitions. See id. (explaining reasons for concluding
that Martin's use of cart was reasonable).
140. See id. (explaining district court's finding that Martin could not walk
course was supported by sufficient evidence). The court commented that Martin's
inability to walk the course is no longer disputed. See id. (noting lack of dispute as
to impact of Martin's leg condition on his ability to walk course).
141. See id. (discussing fundamental nature of game). The court based its
determination that walking was not fundamental to the general game of golf on
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The court, however, agreed with PGA's assertion that they offer not just a
generalized game of golf on the PGA and Nike Tours, but rather a particu-
lar competition. 142
In addressing the issue of whether modifying the no-cart rule to per-
mit Martin to ride a cart would fundamentally alter the PGA and Nike
Tour competitions, the court decided not to disturb the factual findings of
the district court.143 Based on the district court's findings, the court con-
cluded that granting Martin the use of a golf cart in the PGA and Nike
Tour competitions would not fundamentally alter the nature of those
competitions. 144 The court stated that "[a]ll that the cart does is permit
Martin access to a type of competition in which he otherwise could not
engage because of his disability. That is precisely the purpose of the
ADA."145 The PGA argued that its "substantive" rules should not be sub-
two factors: (1) The Rules of Golf promulgated by the USGA and the Royal and
Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland, do not require golfers to walk; and (2)
PGA allows players to use carts during the first two rounds of the qualifying school
and on the Senior Tour. See id. (explaining reasons).
142. See id. at 999-1000. (describing PGA's argument). The court noted that
"PGA provides, in the Conditions of Competition for its PGA and Nike Tours, that
'[p] layers shall walk at all times during a stipulated round unless permitted to ride
by the PGA TOUR Rules Committee."' Id. The court observed instances when the
Committee has allowed players to ride, such as: (1) when all players must be shut-
tled from the ninth green to the tenth tee when the distance is too great; and (2)
when players are given rides from the fairway back to the tee because the players
lose a ball and must hit it again. See id. at 1000 (describing instances when players
may ride). The court stated that when the Committee allows players to ride, the
waiver applies to all players. See id. (noting universal application of waivers).
143. See id. at 1000 (addressing issue of accommodation fundamentally alter-
ing competition). The court noted that the district court made the following find-
ings: (1) PGA was injecting a fatigue factor into the shot-making of the game by
requiring players to walk; (2) "the fatigue factor injected into the game of golf by
walking the course cannot be deemed significant under normal circumstances";
(3) the stamina factor in the competitions was due to mostly psychological phe-
nomenon such as stress and motivation; (4) players in other tours, when given the
choice to walk or ride, usually choose to walk; and (5) in events where PGA per-
mits players to use carts, "it assigns no handicap penalty to those who ride as op-
posed to those who walk." See id. (describing district court findings). The court
also stated that Martin still has to walk about twenty-five percent of the course, and
endures considerable pain while doing so. See id. (explaining that Martin must
walk certain areas of course because he cannot be brought nearer to his ball in
many instances). The court noted that after examining all of these factors, the
district court concluded that Martin "'easily endures greater fatigue even with a
cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking.'" Id. (quoting district court
opinion). The court concluded that the district court's determination that the
fatigue factor injected into the game was insignificant was not clearly erroneous.
See id. at 1001 (concluding that district court's determination not clearly
erroneous).
144. See id. (stating conclusion). The court explained that permitting Martin
to use a cart would not alter the central aim of the competition in shot-making. See
id. (noting accommodation would not affect shot-making ability).
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 46: p. 171
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss1/5
2001] NoTE
ject to exceptions to accommodate disability, but the court determined
that the PGA was misinterpreting the statute.1 4 6
Finally, the court disagreed with the PGA's assertion that allowing
Martin to ride a cart would open the floodgates for future decisions in
favor of disabled athletes.147 The court also rejected the PGA's argument
that individualized determinations would impose an intolerable burden
on the PGA.148 Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not
146. See id. (evaluating PGA's argument). The PGA admitted that some ath-
letic rules may be subject to accommodations for the disabled, such as dress codes
or uniform requirements, but contended that rules intended to affect competition
cannot be subjected to an exception. See id. (explaining PGA's argument). The
court reasoned that PGA's interpretation essentially removed the word "funda-
mentally" out of the statutory language, making any alteration of the competition
fundamental. See id. at 1000-01 (rebutting PGA's argument). The court noted that
the statute requires "an inquiry into whether a particular exception to a rule would
'fundamentally alter' the nature of the good or service being offered." Id. at 1001.
Therefore, the court determined that the inquiry should not be whether players'.
use of carts generally would fundamentally alter the competition, but whether per-
mitting Martin to use a cart would do so. See id. (stating proper inquiry). The
court noted that "[t]he evidence must 'focus on the specifics of the plaintiff's or
defendant's circumstances and not on the general nature of the accommoda-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1060
(5th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the court stated that "[t]he mere fact that PGA has
defined walking to be part of the competition cannot preclude inquiry, or PGA will
have been able to define itself out of reach of the ADA." Id.
147. See id. (rejecting floodgates argument). The PGA stated that allowing
Martin to use a golf cart would open the door to "future decisions requiring that
disabled swimmers or runners be given a head start in a race, or that a growth-
impaired basketball player be allowed to shoot three-point baskets from inside the
three-point line." Id. The court expressed its confidence that in these examples
stated by PGA, the courts' fact-based inquiry would result in holdings that these
modifications would fundamentally alter the competitions. See id. (responding to
PGA's slippery slope argument). The court admitted that if Martin were seeking
to "use a special golf ball that carried farther than others, or was seeking to play a
shorter course than his competitors," those accommodations would fundamentally
alter the competitions. See id. (distinguishing use of cart from accommodations
that would fundamentally alter golf competitions).
148. See id. at 1001-02 (rejecting PGA's contention). PGA had refused to con-
sider Martin's condition while maintaining that permitting him to ride a cart
would fundamentally alter the competition. See id. at 1001 (discussing PGA's re-
fusal to consider Martin's condition). PGA also stated that allowing players to ride
carts would place an undue burden on the PGA to determine whether disabled
players riding carts have an advantage over non-disabled walking players. See id.
(repeating PGA's undue burden argument). The court determined that the cases
the PGA cited in support of its argument, circuit court cases upholding age and
semester limits on school students' athletic eligibility, were distinguishable from
Martin's situation. See id. (distinguishing McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026
(6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir.
1994)). The court concluded that:
[t]he foundation of these cases... was a finding, or evidence compelling
a finding, that the rule against older or more experienced high-school
athletes was necessary to protect the competition in the lower age group,
and to prevent "red-shirting" of athletes to permit them to compete when
older and more experienced than the others. The record in this case is
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err in determining that allowing Martin to use a cart was a reasonable
accommodation to his disability and that Martin's use of a cart did not
fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA and Nike Tour
Tournaments.
1 49
2. The Seventh Circuit's Reasoning in Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit limited its analysis to
the issue of whether permitting Olinger to use a cart would fundamentally
alter the nature of the tournaments, finding it unnecessary to decide the
public accommodation issue.1 5 0 In addressing Olinger's contention that
the USGA failed to present sufficient proof that a cart would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the event, the court explained that the concept of
"fundamentally alter" was derived from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,1 5 1 interpreting the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.152 The Olinger court then determined that differ-
ent court holdings, subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis,
have held that "the ADA does not require entities to change their basic
nature, character, or purpose insofar as that purpose is rational, rather
than a pretext for discrimination."
153
The court next analyzed the district court's conclusion that permit-
ting Olinger to ride a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the
quite different; the district court found that the fatigue factor introduced
by walking was not significant.
Id. at 1001-02 (citation omitted).
149. See id. at 1002 (stating conclusion).
150. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (2000)
(describing focus of holding). The court did not analyze whether the golf courses
operated by the USGA for its championships are places of public accommodation.
See id. ("While there may be some logic to [USGA's contention that golf course is a
"mixed use" facility], we hesitate to embrace it for we can resolve this appeal ... on
a more narrow ground [that allowing Olinger to ride a cart fundamentally alters
the nature of the competition].").
151. 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979) (originating concept of "fundamental altera-
tion" under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended throughout 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994))).
152. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (stating origin of "fundamentally alter").
The court noted in Olinger that the Supreme Court held that a reasonable accom-
modation did not include lowering or substantially modifying existing standards to
accommodate a handicapped person. See id. at 1005 (describing Supreme Court's
definition of a reasonable accommodation); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 410 (explain-
ing that this would be "more than the 'modification' the regulation requires").
153. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005. The court also determined that the accommo-
dation must not impose an undue financial and administrative burden on the en-
tity. See id. at 1006 (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973; Nassau County Sch. Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987); Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035 (applying ADA)).
The Sixth Circuit upheld an age limit for high school athletes because "[i]t is
plainly an undue burden to require high school coaches and hired physicians to
determine whether [various] factors render a student's age an unfair competitive
advantage .... It is unreasonable to call upon coaches and physicians to make
these near-impossible determinations." Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
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competition. 154 The court examined the district court's reasoning that
eliminating the walking rule would "remove the stamina from the set of
qualities designed to be tested in this competition." 155 The court agreed
with the district court's determination that Olinger's accommodation is
reasonable in a general sense, but would "alter the fundamental nature of
that competition." 156 The court also stated that the record aptly sup-
ported the district court's findings.1 5 7 Finally, the court concluded that
the district court properly reasoned that allowing Olinger to use a cart
would provide the USGA with the administrative burden of making sure
every applicant for a cart truly needs one.158
Limiting their analysis to whether the USGA must allow Olinger to
compete using a golf cart rather than walking, the court did not address
the broader issue of whether the USGA should "give seriously disabled,
but otherwise well-qualified, golfers a chance to compete." 159 The court
154. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006 (evaluating district court's conclusions).
155. Id. The court quoted the following language from the trial court opin-
ion: "[c]onditions that now affect a golfer's performance, but which lie beyond the
golfer's ability to control-the fatigue born of hills, of heat, of humidity-would
lessen in importance to the competition." Id.
156. Id. The court noted that the district court had focused on the particular-
ity of the U.S. Open and concluded "[t]he point of an athletic competition ... is
to decide who, under conditions that are about the same for everyone, can per-
form an assigned set of tasks better than (not as well as) any other competitor." Id.
(quoting district court decision, Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937 (N.D. Ind. 1999)).
Moreover, the district court determined that "[t]he set of tasks assigned to the
competitor in the U.S. Open includes not merely striking a golf ball with precision,
but doing so under greater than usual mental and physical stress." Id. (quoting
district court decision, Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937).
157. See id. at 1006-07 (evaluating district court's conclusions in light of re-
cord). The court found that the testimony by professional golfer and now CBS
Television analyst Ken Venturi was. "particularly persuasive." See id. (examining
Venturi's testimony). Venturi won the 1964 U.S. Open despite having to walk
thirty-six holes on the final day of the competition in 100-degree weather (with
ninety-seven percent humidity). See id. at 1006 (discussing 1964 U.S. Open). Ven-
turi almost collapsed because of the heat, and after the first eighteen holes, he was
advised by his doctor to discontinue playing. See id. (describing conditions of Ven-
turi's victory). Venturi testified that physical and mental fatigue along with a uni-
form set of rules for all golfers are integral parts of championship-level golf. See id.
(discussing Venturi's testimony). Venturi also described Ben Hogan's win in the
1950 U.S. Open after Hogan was involved in an automobile accident the previous
year and was told that he would never walk again. See id. at 1007 (describing Ven-
turi's account of Hogan's win in 1950). The court also pointed to the testimony of
two medical professionals (one of which was Olinger's own witness), who stated
that physical endurance and stamina are critical factors to determine the winner of
national-level golf competitions. See id. at 1006 (describing medical testimony).
158. See id. at 1007 (explaining district court's second rationale for ruling in
favor of USGA). The court agreed with the district court that it would be overly
burdensome to ask the USGA "to develop a system and a fund of expertise to
determine whether a given applicant truly needs, or merely wants, or could use but
does not need, to ride a cart to compete." Id. (quoting district court decision,
Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937).
159. Id.
29
Holzbaur: Driving into the Rough: Conflicting Decisions on the Rights of Di
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW




1. Place of Public Accommodation
The first issue addressed by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits was
whether the golf courses on which the PGA and the USGA conducted
their competitions were places of public accommodation.16 1 Due to the
outcomes in their respective cases, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ad-
dressed this issue differently. Both the PGA and the USGA asserted that
the courses were "mixed use" facilities and therefore not fully subject to
Title 111.162 They essentially argued that the areas "inside the ropes" were
not places of public accommodation under Title III because the players
inside the ropes were not entitled to the same rights as the public "outside
the ropes."
163
In addressing this issue, the Seventh Circuit hinted that there might
have been some merit to the USGA's contention that the courses were not
places of public accommodation, but the Olinger court did not resolve the
issue and assumed on appeal that the golf courses were places of public
accommodation.1 64 Because Olinger's claim depended on the Seventh
Circuit's determination that the courses were places of public accommo-
dation and that the accommodation would not fundamentally alter the
nature of the activity, the Olinger court could assume that the golf courses
were places of public accommodation and decide the case on a narrower
ground.' 65 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, which had to evaluate both issues to
160. See id. (leaving decision to USGA). The court also commented that Olin-
ger was a highly skilled golfer, and hypothesized that given the choice, Olinger
would probably prefer to walk the course without pain instead of ride. See id. (eval-
uating Olinger's situation).
161. See id. at 1004-05 (evaluating whether USGA-controlled golf courses are
places of public accommodations); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 997-99
(9th Cir. 2000) (indicating examination of public accommodation requirement).
162. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05 (examining USGA's claim that tourna-
ment golf courses are being used as mixed use facilities); Martin, 204 F.3d at 998-
99 (evaluating PGA's claim that its tournament courses are being used as mixed
use facilities); see also 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. B, at 624-26 (illustrating that
sections of "mixed use" facilities that are not open to general public are not subject
to requirements for public accommodations).
163. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05 (discussing USGA's argument); Martin,
204 F.3d at 998 (describing PGA's argument).
164. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05 (assuming golf courses were places of
public accommodation for purposes of appeal). The district court had concluded
that the USGA operated places of pubic accommodation based on its determina-
tion that the USGA restricted the normal operations of its competitive events by
"supervis[ing] the play, provid[ing] the rules, officiat[ing] the play, set[ting] up
the golf course, and determin[ing] the groupings of the players and their tee
times." Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 931-32.
165. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (assuming that competitive part of golf
course on which U.S. Open is played is place of public accommodation). If a court
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conclude that Martin should be permitted to ride a cart, the Seventh Cir-
cuit could limit its analysis to the reasonable accommodation issue, as the
disposition of that issue effectively terminated Olinger's claim.166
In its analysis of the public accommodation issue, the Ninth Circuit
correctly rejected the PGA's argument that the courses could be qualified
as "mixed-use facilities" and observed that Title III does not restrict its
coverage to members of the public.167 The court also correctly noted that
a golf course is listed within the statute as one of the places of public ac-
commodation. 168 The court rejected the PGA's assertion that its courses
are not places of public accommodation because the PGA restricts its com-
petitions to the nation's best golfers. 169 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
correctly concluded that "golf courses remain places of public accommo-
dations while a PGA tournament is being conducted on them. 1 7 0 There-
fore, although the Seventh Circuit did not directly address the issue of
whether the golf courses during competition act as places of public accom-
modation, for the disposition of the second issue, both circuits treated the
golf courses as places of public accommodation under the ADA.171
2. Reasonable Modification (Accommodation)
The second issue addressed by both Circuits was whether permitting
Olinger and Martin to ride golf carts during the tournaments was a rea-
sonable- accommodation under Title 111.172 Both courts agreed that the
accommodation that Olinger and Martin sought was at least reasonable in
finds that the accommodation fundamentallyalters the nature of the program or
activity, the accommodation is not reasonable under the ADA and the plaintiff
loses, regardless of whether the private entity operates a place of public accommo-
dation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (A) (ii)-(iii) (1994) (proscribing that private
entity make reasonable modifications and provide any necessary auxiliary aids and
services unless entity demonstrates that modifications "fundamentally alter the na-
ture of such goods, services, facilities").
166. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (noting that court need not address whether
golf course is place of public accommodation because of conclusion that allowing
use of cart fundamentally alters nature of competition).
167. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 998 (distinguishing PGA's examples of other
mixed-use facilities). The court also noted that Title III does not restrict its cover-
age to the public, but provides that "no individual shall be discriminated against."
Id. n.7 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
168. See id. at 997 (examining ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994)
(defining "a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation" as places of public accommodation).
169. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 998-99 (rejecting PGA's argument).
170. Id. at 999.
171. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (assuming that golf course was place of pub-
lic accommodation); Martin, 204 F.3d at 999 (concluding that golf course was
place of public accommodation).
172. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005-07 (same); Martin, 204 F.3d at 999-1002 (an-
alyzing whether permitting cart use is reasonable modification under Title III); see
alsoJeffrey A. Rosenthal, Should High Court Review Case of Disabled Golfer?, N.Y. L.J.
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a general sense. 173 The Seventh Circuit began by analyzing the Supreme
Court's definition of "fundamental alteration" in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis.174 In Davis, the Court held that the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 was not intended to accommodate individuals who are unable to
"meet all of a program's requirements in spite of a handicap." 175 The
Court also cited relevant precedent holding that various accommodations
were not reasonable if the accommodations impose an undue financial or
administrative burden on the defendant. The Olinger court, however, sus-
piciously ignored its own precedent in Washington v. Indiana High School
Athletic Ass'n,1 76 and inappropriately decided that it did not have to make
the individualized determination Olinger requested.
177
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that the
prior cases stating that the ADA does not require individualized determi-
nations were inapplicable to the issue before them.1 78 The court noted
that in the high school age-eligibility exception cases, the deciding factors
were either that the rule was necessary or that an individualized determi-
nation would impose an undue burden on the high school coaches and
officials. 179 The court distinguished Martin's case by reasoning that un-
173. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1003 (noting prevalence of carts on golf courses);
Martin, 204 F.3d at 999 (explaining that allowing Martin to ride cart is reasonable
because it solves Martin's problem of access to competition and golf carts are used
in other competitions, such as on Senior Tour).
174. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005 (analyzing Davis).
175. Id. (citing Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 397 (1979)). In
Davis, a deaf nursing student asked the college to permit her to substitute work for
the clinical work she couldn't complete because of her disability. See Davis, 422
U.S. at 397 (describing story of disabled student).
176. 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 579 (1999).
177. See Rosenthal, supra note 172, at 10 (noting that Seventh Circuit ignored
prior precedent). In Washington, a learning-disabled high school athlete requested
that the Indiana High School Athletic Association waive its eight-semester rule. See
Washington, 181 F.3d at 842-43 (describing Washington's petition for waiver of
rule). The eight-semester rule provided that a student's athletic eligibility only
extended for eight semesters following the student's commencement of ninth
grade. See id. at 842 (discussing rule). The court refused to follow earlier circuit
court precedent and adopted an individualized determination approach for han-
dling cases with disabilities. See id. at 851 (explaining individualized approach was
more consistent with congressional intent and Supreme Court's decision in Nassau
County Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
178. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1001-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 00-24) (examining cases where courts
concluded that individualized determinations were not required under ADA); see
also Rosenthal, supra note 172, at 10 (noting that PGA's argument that Ninth Cir-
cuit erred in making individualized determination was based on dicta, and court
actually made decision without determination).
179. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001-02 (distinguishing cases); Rosenthal, supra
note 172, at 10 (noting distinction between Olinger, Martin and the high school
age-limit eligibility cases); see also Heckman, supra note 18, at 23-32 (discussing
impact of cases involving high school students challenging athletic associations'
age requirements and eight-semester rules).
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like age in the high school eligibility cases, the district court here found
that the fatigue from walking was not significant.' 8 0
The Ninth Circuit also correctly rejected the PGA's assertion that the
courts should not interfere with an athletic association's "substantive"
rules and correctly determined that the PGA's characterization of the
walking rule as "substantive" was not conclusive. 181 The PGA was attempt-
ing to imply that because it characterized the walking rule as "substantive,"
referring to how the game was to be played rather than who played it, the
rule should be deemed fundamental to the game and not disturbed by the
courts.1 8 2 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit properly limited its analysis to
whether it would be a reasonable accommodation for Martin to ride a cart,
not whether carts are reasonable in general.' 8 3 By limiting its analysis to
whether allowing Casey Martin to ride a cart fundamentally alters the na-
ture of the game of golf, and not broadening the scope of the inquiry, the
Ninth Circuit corresponded with an earlier Fifth Circuit holding.'
8 4
The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court offered two reasons
in support of the USGA, which the Seventh Circuit found were "amply
supported in the record."18 5 First, the stories of professional Hall-of-Fame
golfers Ben Hogan and Ken Venturi emphasized "the importance and tra-
dition of walking in championship-level tournament golf competition."
18 6
Second, the district court concluded that forcing the USGA to allow some
players to use carts would impose an undue burden on the USGA by forc-
ing them to evaluate any number of requests.' 8 7 In upholding both of
180. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000 (discussing district court's holding).
181. See id. at 1000-01 (rejecting PGA's argument that courts cannot modify
substantive rules of athletic association); see also Rosenthal, supra note 172, at 10
(explaining that just because PGA's rule is self-defined as "substantive," rule is not
any more fundamental). But see Parent, supra note 3, at 140-43 (stating that defer-
ence should be given to sports association rules because interference by courts or
other outside parties will destroy physical landscape of sports, where different rules
apply to different players based upon their physical disabilities).
182. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000-01 (discussing PGA's argument).
183. See id. at 1001 (stating that inquiry must be whether use by Martin will
fundamentally alter nature of activity).
184. See id. at 1001 (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d
1052 (5th Cir. 1997)). In the Fifth Circuit decision in Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./
Spoetzel Brewery, a blind plaintiff brought an action against the owner of a beer
brewery alleging that the brewery's refusal to allow him to take a public brewery
tour with his guide dog violated the ADA. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1055-56 (describ-
ing background of case). The court concluded that Johnson properly demon-
strated that allowing his guide dog was reasonable, and that the defendant did not
demonstrate the permitting the dog on the tour would fundamentally alter the
nature of the activity. See id. at 1064-65 (stating conclusion). The Martin court
found that their focus on Martin's individual circumstances and not on the general
nature of the accommodation followed the persuasive analysis set forth in Johnson.
See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001 (citing Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1060).
185. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2000).
186. Id. at 1006-07.
187. See id. at 1007 (noting district court's second rationale for deciding in
favor of USGA).
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these findings, the Seventh Circuit avoided enforcing the purpose of re-
medial statutes like the ADA.188
By examining the cases of these two players, the Olinger court focused
on whether the USGA should permit players to ride carts during its events,
instead of examining whether it would be a reasonable modification to
allow Olinger to ride a cart.1 89 The court retold very powerful stories
about Hogan and Venturi, two people who overcame great odds to win
major tournaments, but the stories do not signify that walking is essential
to the game of golf.19 0 If walking were essential to the game of golf, golfers
would not be allowed to use carts during the first two rounds of the quali-
fying school, Senior PGA Tour players would not be riding carts during
tournaments and the USGA would not allow women golfers to ride carts
during the United States Women's Amateur.19' As for the argument that
such allowances would impose an undue burden on the USGA to adminis-
ter all of the applications for waiving the cart rule, the Ninth Circuit found
that it was not an intolerable burden on the PGA to administer the pro-
cess. 19 2 Because the USGA is also considered the governing body of golf,
it should not be difficult for the governing body of golf to administer the
considerably smaller number of players that will request carts in the
future.193
V. IMPACT/CONCLUSION
As of the date of this Note, the Ninth Circuit decision still stands, and
Casey Martin is riding his cart during PGA and Buy.com Tour tourna-
ments. 194 The most common criticism of this holding is that there will be
a slippery slope of cases resulting from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mar-
188. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 288 (1985) (noting that remedial
statutes such as Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provide "evenhanded treatment and the
opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and benefit from" ser-
vices or activities offered by covered entities). The Supreme Court did state, how-
ever, that transferring benefits are not done "simply to meet the reality that the
[disabled] have greater medical needs." Id. at 303.
189. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (concluding
that court must make individualized inquiry to determine if person is disabled);
Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992)
(holding that under ADA, policy of excluding Little League baseball coaches in
wheelchairs from being on field required individualized assessment of severity of
risk to players).
190. See generally Parent, supra note 3, at 140-41 (describing the Supreme
Court's interpretations of "fundamental" and "essential").
191. For discussion of exceptions to the no-cart rules of the PGA and USGA,
see supra notes 89-91, 116-17 and accompanying text.
192. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 00-24) (noting that it would not be
intolerable burden for PGA to conduct individualized determination).
193. For a discussion on the USGA's governing power, see supra note 105-09
and accompanying text.
194. See Charles Lane, High Court to Hear Disabilities Act Case: Golfer's Suit
Against PGA Put on Agenda, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at A8 (noting that until
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tin.1 95 Some commentators have argued that courts should not interfere
with athletic associations' substantive rules because that might change the
landscape of athletics.1 9 6 A difficulty with these cases under the ADA is
that each individual's disability is to be judged on a case-by-case basis; how-
ever, it is not likely that an overwhelming number of lawsuits will be initi-
ated by individuals suing professional sports associations. 19 7 Possibly the
most difficult aspect in addressing the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement in competitive settings is that "the ADA essentially requires a
court to measure an unquantifiable factor (the level of Casey Martin's fa-
tigue vs. the fatigue of able-bodied golfers) in a program based on quanti-
fication (professional tournament golf) ."198
The Supreme Court granted the PGA's petition for a writ of certiorari
on September 26, 2000 and heard argument on the case on January 17,
2001.199 The Court has heard numerous cases in the last couple of years
requiring their interpretation of the ADA. 20 0 Recently, the Court pro-
vided a restricted view of the ADA's protected class.201 The Court has also
tended to "textualize" statutory interpretation under the ADA. 20 2 The
issue is decided by Supreme Court, PGA contends that it will continue to abide by
Ninth Circuit ruling permitting Martin to ride golf cart during competitions).
195. See Baker, supra note 63, at 763 (explaining that commentators have sug-
gested that as result of Martin holding "one-armed pitchers could possibly sue to
force Major League Baseball to provide a 'designated fielder,'" and that NBA play-
ers could sue for right to use roller skates); see also Laurie Asseo, Supreme Court to
Hear Appeal by PGA Tour, The Tour Contends That Allowing Casey Martin to Use Golf
Cart Violates Its Ability to Set and Enforce Rules for Competition, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Sept. 27, 2000, at C1 (repeating PGA's statement that Martin decision "open[s] the
door to workplace discrimination lawsuits by independent contractors and other
non-employees").
196. See Parent, supra note 3, at 140-43 (describing failure of district court in
Martin to give proper deference to PGA Tour rules, and discussing possible
results).
197. See Sharpe, supra note 2, at 807 (noting rarity of Martin case because
issue in most ADA cases is whether plaintiff meets ADA's definition of disability).
198. Long, supra note 17, at 1378.
199. See U.S. Supreme Court, WESTLAw BULLETIN, Sept. 26, 2000 (noting Court's
grant of writ of certiorari in Martin). The questions presented are: (1) "whether
Tide III of the ADA regulates standards established for competitors in athletic
competitions held at places of public accommodation," and, if so, (2) "whether
Title III requires professional sports organizations to grant selective waivers of
their substantive rules of athletic competition in order to accommodate disabled
competitors." Id. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 172, at 10 (noting Court's
periodic interest in sports cases, and recognizing that some Justices are avid
golfers).
200. See Rosenthal, supra, note 172, at 10 n.38 (discussing recently decided
Supreme Court cases concerning ADA).
201. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492-93 (1999) (holding
that ADA's anti-discrimination provisions do not cover individuals with corrective
impairments that are not presently substantially limited in any major life activities).
202. See Hentges, supra note 8, at 152 (noting recent Supreme Court deci-
sions taking textual approach, not remedial approach, to statutory interpretation).
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Court has not, however, had any significant cases dealing with Title III of
the ADA. 2
03
No matter how the Supreme Court decides, Casey Martin's and Ford
Olinger's cases have helped enlighten the battle of not only disabled ath-
letes, but also disabled individuals in general. The cases have also led the
path for other disabled golfers to challenge established golf associa-
tions. 204 The Martin case will give the Supreme Court another chance to
clarify the reach of the ADA.20 5 Hopefully, the Court will not push the
ADA out of the reach of other disabled athletes.
Steven A. Holzbaur
203. See id. at 161 n.188 (explaining that only Title III case that Court has
heard was Bragdon v. Abbott, but Court in that case based its holding in other areas
of ADA).
204. See Rosenthal, supra, note 172, at 10 (describing story of Ja Ro Jones).
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Jones v. United
States Golf Ass'n, Inc., followed the Martin decisions and enjoined the USGA from
prohibitingJa RoJones from using a golf cart during the Senior U.S. Open. See id.
(citing Civ. No. A-00-Ca-278 JN, Order dated June 15, 2000). Jones is a former
teaching professional who has post-polio syndrome, a disease causing leg and
shoulder muscles to atrophy, resulting in fatigue. See Natalie Gott, Disabled Golfer
Can Use Cart, Assoc. PRESs, Aug. 31, 2000 (describingJones' condition), available at
2000 WL 25992739.
Another story involves a twenty-five year old assistant professional from Or-
lando Florida who can only hit golf balls with his right arm. See Mike Purkey ed.,
Seen & Heard, GoLt MAG., Oct. 2000, at 24-29 (describing Ryan Ely's story). Ryan
Ely has restricted use of the left side of his body because of a "near fatal breech
delivery at birth that deprived his brain of oxygen for a few seconds." Id. at 24.
Ely is attempting to enter the PGA of America's Golf Professional Training
Program ("GPTP"), which is a three-year program providing instruction for young
professionals hoping to gain employment within the golf industry. See id. (describ-
ing GPTP). For Ely to be admitted to the GPTP, he must pass a playing ability test
("PAT"). See id. (noting that Ely must pass PAT). To pass the PAT, Ely would
probably have to play thirty-six holes in one day and shoot a pre-determined score
based on the golf course's USGA rating. See id. (explaining PAT). Ely's problem is
that even his best scores are not low enough to pass the PAT. See id. (stating that
despite fact that Ely can hit 240 yard drives while using only his right arm, and that
Ely has respectable sixteen handicap, his disability essentially prevents him from
shooting scores required by PGA).
PGA informed Ely that they would not waive the PAT for him. See id. (noting
PGA's denial of waiver). According to Ely's father, the PGA's executive director
informed Ryan that he could choose a course where he could ride a cart, would
not have to play thirty-six holes in one day, and the course could be shortened to
about six thousand yards. See id. (describing statements allegedly made to father
by PGA official). Barring any problems in the future, Ryan Ely does not want to
pursue the matter legally, however, hoping that he and PGA will come to an amica-
ble arrangement. See id. (noting Ely's wish that his case does not become like
Casey Martin's).
205. See Lane, supra note 194, at A8 (commenting that Court's intent to clarify
scope of ADA is emphasized by their review of Martin); David G. Savage, The Law
Justices Agree to Tee One Up, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at A5 (stating that Martin will
allow Court to clarify ADA).
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